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ABSTRACT 
Considering the multitude of security requirements 
engineering methodologies available today, selecting a security 
requirement engineering methodology that fits the security 
engineering context becomes a promising task. In previous work, 
we outlined a generic evaluation methodology to elicit and 
evaluate the anticipated characteristics of a security 
requirements engineering methodology according to the 
stakeholders’ working context. In this paper, we detail each step 
of our methodology using an example context of network 
security requirements engineering. 
and refine the characteristic goals at step1 and step2. For SRE 
context, we consider an example use case related to the, working 
context of the security experts involved in network security 
engineering process. In end, we will briefly explain step3 with 
some sample evaluation results. 
Figure 1: Our evaluation methodology 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
introduces the SRE context of our evaluation. In Section 3 we 
discuss the application of our evaluation methodology to the SRE 
context considered. Finally, we conclude our work in Section 4. 
2 Scenario context 
The scenario concerns a situation related to the maintenance 
of the aircraft to anticipate the health of the on-board aircraft 
system by verifying specific parameters of the On-board aircraft 
system (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Example scenario context 
The On-board aircraft system is integrated the aircraft 
monitoring application and the aircraft control application that 
are connected to each other via an internal avionic bus network. 
The maintenance people are allowed to connect their laptops to 
the monitoring application in order to fetch the monitored 
parameters. The security goals are expressed in terms of 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Security requirements engineering is an important activity 
since bad security requirements can lead to ineffective security 
or worth security holes. However, given the plethora of security 
requirements engineering methodologies available today, 
choosing a good SRE methodology is still a complex task. Many 
comparative and evaluation studies exist. However, they are not 
reusable due to various issues such as: ad-hoc criteria, lack of 
consideration of all the phases of RE process; and finally non-
consideration of the working context of the security requirement 
engineers.  
To help address these issues, in our previous paper[1], we 
proposed an evaluation methodology built on the classical idea 
of requirements engineering approach. Figure 1 depicts an 
overview of our approach. It includes three main steps: 1) 
identifying the problem context and eliciting initial high-level 
characteristic goals. This is done by coupling the stakeholder’s 
working SRE context as well as the quality criteria of good 
security requirements; 2) refining the high-level characteristic 
goals into final requirements of the SRE methodology-to-be (RM); 
3) the final step deals with evaluation of the existing SRE 
methodologies using the elicited requirements (RM).
Our discussion in the previous paper focused mainly on 
outlining the generic idea of our evaluation methodology. In this 
paper, we will explain how our methodology is applied to the 
SRE context of the stakeholders. More specifically, we emphasize 
our discussion on how goal modelling approach is used to elicit 
protecting the integrity and availability of the monitored 
parameters. 
Hence, the aircraft network security design must ensure a 
trusted transmission of parameters from the aircraft control 
application to the monitoring application and then to the laptop 
of maintenance people. In addition to these high-level security 
requirements, network design choices are dependent to more 
technical security requirements. E.g., maintenance people can 
potentially connect to the aircraft using an Ethernet cable or a 
wireless connection. This scenario gathers network security 
requirements context information in an unstructured format. It 
provides some insights on what kind of network security 
requirements can be elicited. However, the question of SRE 
methodology goodness from the point of view of the security 
experts is still open. Without this information it will difficult to 
anticipate what kind of SRE methodology would be interesting 
to the security experts. 
3 Application of our methodology 
3.1 Step1: Problem context and initial 
requirement analysis 
The initial step of our approach allows analysing the security 
problem context of the example scenario given in section 2. 
Accordingly, this step deals with interviewing the people 
involved in the security engineering process. We have developed 
an elicitation tools using a consolidated list of 20 characteristics 
of good security requirements provided in our previous paper[2], 
see Figure 3. The first three columns contain a unique identifier, 
a quick one-line definition and corresponding synonyms found 
in the literature. The last column describes the quality criteria 
via a set of questions, each reflecting different perspectives of 
the respective criterion definition. This elicitation tool facilitates 
to trigger the discussions. It acts as a common platform to 
discuss as well as to obtain common understanding of their 
perspectives and expectations. 
Figure 3: Sample of the elicitation tool 
At the end of step1, every quality criteria of the elicitation 
tool must have been analysed and their respective 
interpretations should be agreed. We used KAOS goal modelling 
notation to represent the SRE-methodology-to-be goal 
refinement hierarchy. In Figure 4, the high-level goals are the 
quality criteria from our elicitation tool (goals in orange). The 
elicited interpretations are the immediate sub-goals (in green). 
We used different colouring to the goal nodes to facilitate the 
understanding of the readers; these colours are not compliant 
with KAOS. 
Figure 4: Sample of the SRE-methodology-to-be goals 
refinement 
3.2 Step2: Refinement requirement analysis 
In this step2 the high-level abstract goals realized in step 1 
are coarse-grained into refined sub-goals fitting to specific 
demands of the security experts. The refinement is expressed 
using AND-construct. In some cases it is possible that a sub-goal 
can be refined from multiple high-level goals. E.g. RM3 can be 
derived from RM3 and RM2 with a justification stating that the 
requirements not respecting the abstraction requirements of the 
stakeholders are not comprehensible. This type of refinement 
patterns explains the semantic dependencies between the quality 
characteristics. It also explicitly reflects the merging of the 
different security experts’ points of views. The refinement is 
No
Abstract criterion 
abstract definition
Criterion Names 
in use
QUESTIONAIRES
To what extent does the SRE methodology 
facilitate?
C2
Compatible, non-
contradictory 
requirements
Consistent 1) Does the SRE methodology allow to verify 
the conflicts between the requirements, goals, 
assumptions and the domain properties?
C3
Accomplishable 
within the given 
financial, time, 
legal, technical 
constraints
Feasible/affordab
le
legal
Achievable
1) Does it allow to capture all the constraints 
pertinent to a security requirement? such as 
technical? Legal? Time? Financial? And time 
and costs of the implementation?
3) How long does it take to learn the
methodology? Is it within the time constraints?
4) what are the training costs?  do they exceed
the financial constraints?
performed until the final refined goals are realized as verifiable 
objectively. O1ùy then the final sub-goals (leaf nodes) qualify as 
the evaluation criteria. However, the type of verification method 
and expected performance metrics differs with respect to the 
type of evaluation criteria. For instance, let' s consider the 
evaluation criterion RM6.2 It states "the SRE methodology-to-be 
allows to annotate each requirements with risk attributes". The 
verification method must facilitate to evaluate the supportability 
of the SRE-methodology-to-be in capturing risk attributes related 
to environmental constraints and interaction dependency 
constraints, risk priority information. Respectively, the 
performance metrics to measure the supportability of this 
criterion is defmed as in Table 1: 
Table 1: Verification method for RM6.2
Verification method Performance 
111easure 
Requirement cannot be annotated with nil 
any risk information 
Requirements can be annotated with at low 
least one of the attributes 
Requirements can be annotated with medium 
risk priority and threat events 
The annotation feature is extensible. high 
Requirements can be annotated with 
any risk attributes. 
Fmally, our approach has showed 1ts benefits. We fom1d new 
evaluation criteria (namely RM3.2, RM6.1 and R�.4) that were 
related to network security requirements engineering context. 
3.1 Step3: Evaluation of the SRE methodologies 
W e tested the evaluation criteria on three distinct SRE 
methodologies Secure KAOS (a goal-oriented methodology -
noted KAOS) [3], Secure Socio-Technical System (an agent­
oriented methodology - noted STS) [ 4] and Security Engineering 
Process using Patterns (a problem-oriented methodology - noted 
SEPP) [5]. We derived security requirements for the example 
scenario given in section 2. During this practical experiment, we 
analyzed the supportability of SRE methodologies using the 
verification methods for each of the evaluation criteria. At the 
end of our evaluation st:udy, we found that there are some 
criteria that are not supported by any of the above three 
methodologies, see Table 2. The criteria RM3.2, RM6.1 and 
RM6.4 are notably related to the network security requirements 
engineering context. The evaluation measure we used is 
qualitative and defmed as high for highly supportable, medium 
for partially supportable, low for less likely supportable and nil 
for not supportable. Due to the limitation of space we have not 
included the detailed discussion on the performance of the SRE 
methodologies and the evaluation results. 
Table 2: Sample of the evaluation results 
Evaluation criteria list (RM) STS Secure SEPP 
KAOS 
RM3.2: Should facilitate to nil nil nil 
know when to start considering 
network infrastrncture 
RM6.1: Must facilitate to nil nil nil 
specify and link network 
security zone information 
RM6.4: Must facilitate to nil nil nil 
capture the cost constraints 
pertaining to implementation 
of the security requirement 
4 Conclusion and Future Perspectives 
In this paper, we discussed the three steps of our evaluation 
methodology and applied to the SRE context of network security 
engineering. We used KAOS goal modelling notation to express 
the refinement of the characteristic goals of SRE methodology. 
The leaf nodes will eventually become the evaluation criteria. 
W e have tested the criteria to evaluate three SRE methodologies 
(KAOS, STS and SEPP). For future work, we would like to apply 
our evaluation approach to other security engineering contexts. 
This will help us to determine which SRE methodology 
evaluation criteria are common and which are specific to 
security context. 
Acknowledgement 
This work is part. of project IREHDO2 funded by 
DGA/DGAC. The authors thank ail the security experts at 
Airbus and the anonymous reviewers for providing their useful 
comments. 
REFERENCES 
[1] 
[2] 
[3] 
[4] 
[5] 
S. T. Btùusu, R. Laborde, F. Barrère, A. Benzekri, and A.
samer Wazan, 'Which Security Requirements Engineering 
Methodology Should I Choose? Towards a Requirements 
Engineering-based Evaluation Approach', presented at the 
ARES'2017, Reggio Calabria, ITALY, 2017. 
S. T. Btùusu, R. Laborde, F. Barrère, A. Benzekri, and A.
samer Wazan, 'Towards the weaving of the characteristics 
of good security requirements', in CRISIS 2016, Roscoff, 
France, 2017. 
A. van Lamsweerde, 'Elaborating security requirements
by construction of intentional anti-models', in 26th
International Conference on Software Engineering, 2004. 
ICSE 2004. Proceedings, 2004, pp. 148-157.
E. Paja, F. Dalpiaz, and P. Giorgini, 'Sts-tool: Security
requirements engineering for socio-technical systems', in
Engineering Secure Future Internet Services and Systems,
Springer, 2014, pp. 65-96. 
D. Hatebur, .M. Heisel, and H. Schmidt, 'A pattern system 
for security requirements engineering', in Availability, 
Reliability and Security, 2007. ARES 2007. The Second 
International Conference on, 2007, pp. 356-365.
